Rankings of utility functions generated by simple n-th order risk-averse transformations are not partial orders, and therefore, do not yield reliable comparative statics predictions, except at the second order. Restrictions have been identified that rectify this deficiency at the third order...

It is shown that the downside risk aversion measure du is a special case of the more general Schwarzian downside risk aversion measure Su for appropriate preferences, in which case the downside measure du then inherits the desirable properties of the Schwarzian measure Su

Analagous to the notion of greater risk aversion being that the resulting utility function v = φ(u) is a concave transformation φ of the original utility function u (i.e., φ′′ < 0); the apparent definition of v being more downside risk averse is that φ′ is convex (i.e., φ′′′ > 0). This definition, however, suffers from logical inconsistencies as an ordering. We propose, instead, the...</0);>

An intrinsic, but seldom recognized property of greater risk aversion in expected utility theory is its reversibility, viz., utility v=phi(u) is more risk averse than u if and only if the transformation function phi is concave, while equivalently, u=psi(v) is less risk averse than v if and only...

We present two theorems that yield necessary and sufficient conditions for first and second-degree stochastic dominance deteriorations of background risk to increase risk aversion, prudence, temperance, and all higher degrees of aversion to foreground risk. We thus complete the program initiated...

The value of information regarding risk class for a monopoly insurer and its customers is examined in both symmetric and asymmetric information environments. A monopolist always prefers contracting with uninformed customers as this maximizes the rent extracted under symmetric information while...

This paper characterizes, under the most general conditions to date, the steady-state equilibria of a symmetric, two-country trade model in which countries move in alternating-move, dynamic either tariffsetting or quota-setting games in Markov Perfect strategies, and compares the respective...

This paper characterizes, under the most general conditions to date, the steady-state equilibria of a symmetric, two-country trade model in which countries move in alternating-move, dynamic either tariffsetting or quota-setting games in Markov Perfect strategies, and compares the respective...

Understanding why some human populations remain persistently poor remains a significant challenge for both the social and natural sciences. The extremely poor are generally reliant on their immediate natural resource base for subsistence and suffer high rates of mortality due to parasitic and...