In this paper, we study the impact of co-investment by incumbents and entrants on the roll-out of network infrastructures under demand uncertainty. We show that if entrants can wait to co-invest until demand is realized, the incumbents' investment incentives are reduced and total coverage can be...

Our market modelling approach aims at practically determining wholesale pricing policies for the switch from copper to fibre access networks. It asks which market equilibria for incumbents and entrants result from different combinations of copper and fibre wholesale access charges. We first...

Two-part tariffs, when used at the retail level, increase efficiency by lowering the price of marginal units. The same potential for higher efficiency exists for two-part tariffs at wholesale level for a given market structure, but the fixed part of the wholesale tariff can negatively affect the...

In this paper, we study the impact of co-investment by incumbents and entrants on the roll-out of network infrastructures under demand uncertainty. We show that if entrants can wait to co-invest until demand is realized, the incumbents' investment incentives are reduced and total coverage can be...

In this paper, we study the impact of co-investment by incumbents and entrants on the roll-out of network infrastructures under demand uncertainty. We show that if entrants can wait to coinvest until demand is realized, the incumbents' investment incentives are reduced and total coverage can be...

We propose a novel approach to the evaluation of new network technologies that combines an engineering cost model with a differentiated multi-player oligopoly model subject to wholesale access regulation. It is based on Hoernig et al. (2010), 1 which examines the cost differentials and...

Performance-based regulation (PBR) is influenced by the Bayesian and non-Bayesian incentive mechanisms. While Bayesian incentives are impractical, the insights from their properties can be combined with practical non-Bayesian mechanisms for application to transmission pricing. This combination...

Will telecommunications policy in the form of industry-specific regulation go away? A literature review of the five policy areas (1) termination monopoly, (2) local bottleneck access, (3) net neutrality, (4) spectrum management, and (5) universal service suggests that in some of them a move to...

Currently, U.S. and EU telecommunications policies differ in many respects. For example, wholesale access to local loops is largely deregulated in the U.S. but continues to be regulated in the EU. Or, the U.S. has an elaborate universal service policy with a set of universal service funds and...

Based on an idiosyncratic reading of the literature I propose intermediate (rather than tight or soft) regulation for balancing investment incentives with allocative efficiency and competition objectives. Intermediate regulation is compatible with incentive regulation and helps lengthening the...