This paper looks into potential determinants of the mode of international competition in a polluting good market by analyzing a strategic interaction between two environmentally concerned governments. From the equilibrium outcomes of our game based on an international duopoly model with...

This paper looks into potential determinants of the mode of international competition in a polluting good market by analyzing a so-called timing game between two environmentally concerned governments. From the equilibrium results of our intergovernmental game based on an international duopoly...

This paper reports an intriguing property of a nonlinear feedback Nash strategy equilibrium in a dynamic game with no state variable in the payoff of each player. While the open-loop Nash and linear feedback Nash equilibria coincide with the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium in such a framework,...

This paper examines how the opening of trade affects a countryfs welfare in the context of an international polluting duopoly model with transboundary stock pollution. In this framework, we show that trade liberalization can have quite different welfare implications, depending on the mode of...

We formulate a dynamic game model of trade in an exhaustible resource with a quantity-setting cartel. We compute the feedback Nash equilibrium and two Stackelberg equilibria under two different leadership scenarios: leadership by the strategic importing country, and leadership by the exporting...

We formulate a dynamic game model of trade in an exhaustible resource with a quantity-setting cartel. We compute the feedback Nash equilibrium and two Stackelberg equilibria under two different leadership scenarios: leadership by the strategic importing country, and leadership by the exporting...

Does a country strictly gain if it acts as a leader in a resource market under bilateral monopoly? Using differential games, we show that the answer is "yes" when leadership can be exercised globally (global Stackelberg leadership), but possibly "no" when it is exercised only at each stage...

We first report three empirical findings from our survey on the contracting-out of municipal waste collection services in Japan: 1) the rate of contracting-out and the contract price are inversely related, 2) this inverse relationship tapers out as the contracting rate becomes sufficiently high,...