A dominant firm holding import quota engages in inter-temporal price discrimination when facing a competitive fringe engaged in seasonal production. This causes a welfare loss that comes in addition to the loss attributable to limitation of imports below the free trade level.

A dominant firm holding import quota engages in inter-temporal price discrimination when facing a competitive fringe engaged in seasonal production. This causes a welfare loss that comes in addition the loss attributable to limitation of imports below the free trade level.

Cet article propose une estimation de la production potentielle et un modèle d’écart de production au Liban en utilisant plusieurs méthodes statistiques comme la méthode de la tendance linéaire, le filtre d’Hodrick-Prescott et la méthode de la tendance segmentée. Dans la mesure où le...

In a 2-country monetary union, this paper studies a Stackelberg game be- tween the Central Banker and two symmetrical countries. The central banker chooses the money supply. In each country, there is a union who acts as a monopoly of labor supply. Firms are wage and price takers. We analyze the...

In a 2-country and 3-period OLG model with education, we study the impact on international migration of the two sided characteristics of borders. Individuals must first "leave" their home country before "entering" the destination country. Indeed, each social planner chooses the static welfare...

In a 2-country monetary union, this paper studies a Stackelberg game be- tween the Central Banker and two symmetrical countries. The central banker chooses the money supply. In each country, there is a union who acts as a monopoly of labor supply. Firms are wage and price takers. We analyze the...

We study incentive-compatible labour contracts in the case where individual productivity, preference for leisure and time preference rate are unobservable by the principal in a two-period model. We first reduce this three-dimensional problem to a standard one-dimensional screening problem....