A principal contracts optimally with an agent to operate a firm over an infinite time horizon when the agent is liquidity constrained and has access to private information about the sequence of cost realizations. We formulate this mechanism design problem as a recursive dynamic program in which...

A principal contracts optimally with an agent to operate a firm over an infinite time horizon when the agent is liquidity constrained and has access to private information about the sequence of cost realizations. We formulate this mechanism design problem as a recursive dynamic program in which...

We propose a class of dynamic models that capture subjective (and hence unobservable) constraints on the amount of information a decision maker can acquire, pay attention to, or absorb, via an Information Choice Process (ICP). An ICP specifies the information that can be acquired about the...

Game Theory plays a fundamental role in the social sciences. In this dissertation, we present three essays---the first two dealing with the pure theory of games and the third with an application of game theory to political economy. In the firstessay, we consider the effect of unbounded...

We study the effect of communication in two-person games of incomplete information. We show that any rational mediated communication mechanism satisfying a Nash domination condition can be implemented as the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a communication extension of the original game and ends...

We consider a decision maker who experiences transient preference shocks when faced with dynamic decision situations that involve intertemporal tradeoffs, such as those in consumption savings problems. We axiomatize a recursive representation of choice over infinite horizon consumption problems...

Aumann and Hart (Econometrica, Nov. 2003) have shown that in games of one-sided incomplete information, the set of equilibrium outcomes achievable can be expanded considerably if the players are allowed to communicate without exogenous time limits and completely characterise the equilibria from...

Following Kreps (1979), we consider a decision maker who is uncertain about her future taste for immediate consumption. This uncertainty leaves the decision maker with a preference for flexibility: When choosing among menus containing alternatives for future choice, she weakly prefers menus with...