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On the Information Gathering Role of Firm-Sponsored Training for New Hires
Kim, Doyoung; Lawarree, Jacques - Department of Economics, University of Washington - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671242
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Optimal Task Design: to integrate or separate planning and implementation?
Khalil, Fahad; Kim, Doyoung; Shin, Dongsoo - Department of Economics, University of Washington - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005198631
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CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring
Khalil, Fahad; Lawarree, Jacques - Department of Economics, University of Washington - 2000
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005432303
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On Commitment and Collusion in Auditing
Khalil, Fahad; Lawarree, Jacques - Department of Economics, University of Washington - 2000
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005775297
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CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring
Khalil, Fahad; Lawarree, Jacques - Department of Economics, University of Washington - 2000
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005775305
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Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment
Khalil, Fahad; Lawarree, Jacques - Department of Economics, University of Washington - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785000
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Bribery vs. extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils
Khalil, Fahad; Lawarree, Jacques; Yun, Sungho - Department of Economics, University of Washington - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008740243
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Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information
Khalil, Fahad; Lawarree, Jacques; Scott, Troy J - Department of Economics, University of Washington - 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009003679
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Contracts offered by bureaucrats
Khalil, Fahad; Kim, Doyoung; Lawarrée, Jacques - 2013
We examine the power of incentives in bureaucracies by studying contracts offered by a bureaucrat to her agent. The bureaucrat operates under a fixed budget, optimally chosen by a funding authority, and she can engage in policy drift, which we define as inversely related to her intrinsic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010212358
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Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats
Khalil, Fahad - 2018
We examine the power of incentives in bureaucracies by studying contracts offered by a bureaucrat to her agent. The bureaucrat operates under a fixed budget, optimally chosen by a funding authority, and she can engage in policy drift, which we define as inversely related to her intrinsic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012938445