A mistake in “Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information” motivates a re-examination of some extensions of the solution concept that Aumann introduced.

In a differential information economy with quasi-linear utilities, monetary transfers facilitate the fulfillment of incentive compatibility constraints: the associated ex ante core is generically non-empty. However, we exhibit a wellbehaved exchange economy in which this core is empty, even if...

We consider the class of two-person non-zero-sum infinitely repeated games with incomplete information where Nash equilibria have been characterized, namely games with lack of information on one side and games with private values. We show that in these models, every Nash equilibrium payoff can...

This paper provides a general overview of the literature on the core of an exchange economy with asymetric information. Incentive compatibility is emphasized in studying core concepts at the ex ante and the interim stage.The analysis includes issues of non emptiness of the core as wellas core...

A mechanism is posterior efficient in a differential information economy if at every outcome selected by the mechanism, the agents' expected utilities given this outcome cannot be Pareto improved by any feasible mechanism (in the revised economy). We show that a non-revealing (resp. completely...

In a Bayesian game G, the players first receive private information on the state of nature and then simultaneously choose an action. We assume that the vector of actions a generates a signal g(a). A mechanism for G is a mapping [ mu ] from the set of states of nature S to the product sert of...

Aumann (1987)'s theorem shows that correlated equilibrium is an expression of Bayesian rationality. We extend this result to games with incomplete information. First, we rely on Harsanyi (1967)'s model and represent the underlying multiperson decision problem as a fixed game with imperfect...

According to a minimalist version of Afriat’s theorem, a consumer behaves as a utility maximizer if and only if a feasibility matrix associated with his choices is cyclically consistent. An ”essential experiment” consists of observed consumption bundles (x1,xn) and a feasibility matrix α....