We introduce learning in a dynamic game of international pollution, with ecological uncertainty. We characterize and compare the feedback non-cooperative emissions strategies of players when the players do not know the distribution of ecological uncertainty but they gain information (learn)...

We characterize the domestic production and imports of food by a country under two scenarios, namely: food security and welfare maximization, in a model with an exogenously given probability of occurrence of an embargo or other sources of supply disruption on the international grain market,...

We study the impact of collective effort in R&D in adaptation technologies, and also spillover effects on formation and size of stable international environmental agreements (IEAs). Our results suggest that it is possible to have more than one size of stable IEA. We can achieve a superior...

We introduce learning in a dynamic game of international pollution, with ecological uncertainty. We characterize and compare the feedback non-cooperative emissions strategies of players when the players do not know the distribution of ecological uncertainty but they gain information (learn)...

We study the effect of heterogeneous growth in demand on resource extraction. Using the Great Fish War framework of Levhari and Mirman (1980), we show that heterogeneity in demand growth has a profound effect on both cooperative and non-cooperative solutions.

We study the effect of heterogeneous growth in demand on resource extraction. Using the Great Fish War framework of Levhari and Mirman (1980), we show that heterogeneity in demand growth has a profound effect on both cooperative (Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg) and cooperative solutions

We first study the optimality of a committed policy mix of tax and subsidy to control pollution when firms are involved in abatement technology R&D that is subject to knowledge spillovers. Then a comparison of tax and subsidy is provided when the policy mix is not available and the regulator can...

This paper, analytically and quantitatively, studies the joint determination of optimal carbon taxation and distortionary fiscal policy in DSGE models. We question a central result of the existing environmental economics literature that the optimal carbon tax in the presence of distortionary...

We study an extraction site reclamation problem in a two-player differential game setting over a finite time horizon. Environmental regulation requires each firm to engage in reclamation efforts during the entire lifespan of the extraction site and to pay an abandonment reclamation fee at the...