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This paper analyzes the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives, and outside ownership concentration. Legal protection a¤ects both the expropriation of shareholders and the blockholder's incentives to monitor. Because of this latter e¤ect and its repercussion on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071555
We present a model of succession in a firm controlled and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on how much, if any, of the shares to float on the stock exchange. We assume that a professional is a better...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745376
This paper analyses takeovers of companies owned by atomistic shareholders and by one minority blockholder, all of whom can only decide to tender or retain their shares. As private benefit extraction is inefficient, the post-takeover share value increases with the bidder’s shareholdings. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005073811
We study the role of legal investor protection for the efficiency of the market for corporate control. Stronger legal investor protection limits the ease with which an acquirer, once in control, can extract private benefits at the expense of non-controlling investors. This, in turn, increases...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013125194
We study the role of legal investor protection for the efficiency of the market for corporate control. Stronger legal investor protection limits the ease with which an acquirer, once in control, can extract private benefits at the expense of non-controlling investors. This, in turn, increases...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013125583
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009357279
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010236189
We study the role of legal investor protection for the efficiency of the market for corporate control. Stronger legal investor protection limits the ease with which an acquirer, once in control, can extract private benefits at the expense of non-controlling investors. This, in turn, increases...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012461648
This paper analyses takeovers of companies owned by atomistic shareholders and by one minority blockholder, all of whom can only decide to tender or retain their shares. As private benefit extraction is ineffcient, the post-takeover share value increases with the bidder's shareholdings. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012714698
This paper examines the role of legal investor protection for the efficiency of the market for corporate control when bidders are financially constrained. In the model, stronger legal investor protection increases bidders' outside funding capacity. However, absent effective bidding competition,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013079580