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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360793
Debating over efficiency-enhancing but inequality-increasing reforms accounts for the routine business of democratic institutions. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) hold that anti-reform bias can be attributed to individual-specific uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses resulting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014169290
In real world bargaining the distribution of seats or voting weights often does not accurately reflect real power. Game-theory predictions are insensitive to nominal differences. We refer to the converse idea that nominal differences matter as power illusion. We experimentally study the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011712668
In many bargaining situations, the distribution of seats or voting weights does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Maaser, Paetzel and Traub (Games and Economic Behavior, 2019) conducted an experiment to investigate the effect of such nominal power differences in the classic Baron-Ferejohn...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200168
We utilize a modified dictator game to analyze whether information about the need of recipients affects dictator giving behavior. Need information is presented as objective information about the recipients' living circumstances (income, public transfers, and travel time to the lab) and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013227360
In many bargaining situations, the distribution of seats or voting weights does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Maaser, Paetzel and Traub [Games and Economic Behavior, 2019] conducted an experiment to investigate the effect of such nominal power differences in the classic Baron-Ferejohn...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013306471
In many bargaining situations, the distribution of seats or voting weights does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Maaser, Paetzel and Traub (Games and Economic Behavior, 2019) conducted an experiment to investigate the effect of such nominal power differences in the classic Baron-Ferejohn...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013171871
We study loyalty in groups that are exogenously assigned based on members' performances in a task. We observe that in-group bias is strong and significant among subjects who score high in performance, and that it is weak and insignificant among those who score low. This asymmetric pattern is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011712737
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011923396
We study the role of performance differences in a task requiring cognitive effort on in-group bias. We show that the in-group bias is strong in groups consisting of high-performing members, and it is weak in low-performing groups. This holds although high-performing subjects exhibit no in-group...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012935083