In this paper, we model lobbying and the initiative process as a one-shot game between groups of citizens and the legislature. We model voters as random utility maximizers, as in McKelvey and Patty (2000). Our solution concept is Bayes equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies. Modeling the...

In this paper we extend the well known "agreeing-to-disagree" and "no-trade" results from economics and game theory to international relations. We show that two rational countries should never agree to go to war when war is inefficient and when rationality is common knowledge. We argue that this...

Ex post review is a common feature of policymaking institutions. We consider a simple environment in which an expert agent makes a policy recommendation, which can then be accepted or rejected by a principal whose policy goals differ from those of the agent. The theory offers testable...

In this paper we consider a model of lobbying in which an interest group can lobby either the bureaucracy or the Congress for their preferred policy. The implications of the choice by a lobbyist of whom to lobby (the agency or the legislature) are explored. The main findings of the paper are...

This paper examines decision-making by political candidates under three different objective functions. In particular, we are interested in when the optimal strategies for expected vote share, expected plurality, and probability of victory maximizing candidates coincide in simple plurality...