In the cost sharing model with technological cooperation, we investigate the implications of a number of consistency requirements. In a context where the enforcing authority cannot prevent agents from splitting or merging their demands (in order to reduce their cost shares), the methods used...

This paper proposes a setting that allows for technological cooperation in the cost sharing model. Dealing with discrete demands, we study two properties: Additivity and Dummy. We show that these properties are insuffcient to guarantee a unit-flow representation similar to that of Wang (1999)....

Suppose that a group have demands for some good. Each one of them owns a technology to produce the good, with these technologies varying in their effectiveness. We consider technologies exhibiting either increasing return to scale (IRS) or decreasing returns to scale (DRS). In each case, we...

In the discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation (Bahel and Trudeau (IJGT, 2013)), we study the implications of a number of properties that strengthen the well-known Dummy axiom. Our main axiom, which requires that costless units of demands do not affect the cost shares, is used...

The notion of veto player was originally introduced in simple games [see Nakamura (1979)], for which every coalition has a value of 0 or 1. In this paper we extend it to monotonic cooperative games with transferable utility: a player has veto power if all coalitions not containing her are...

The present paper examines zero-sum games that are based on a cyclic preference relation defined over anonymous actions. For each of these games, the set of Nash equilibria is characterized. When the number of actions is odd, a unique Nash equilibrium is always obtained. On the other hand, in...

The present work characterizes the unique Nash equilibrium for games that are based on a cyclic preference relation. In the Nash equilibrium of these games, each player randomizes between three specific actions. In particular, an alternative way of deriving the unique Nash equilibrium of the...

This paper explores the implications of the possibility of a shift in environmental damages on the participation in environmental treaties. Using a two-period model where the probability of a regime shift increases with the first-period emissions, we examine the issue of coalition formation...