We construct a price-theoretic model of integration decisions and show that these choices may adversely affect consumers, even in the absence of monopoly power in supply and product markets. Integration is costly to implement but is effective at coordinating production decisions. The price of...

We embed a simple incomplete-contracts model of organization design in a standard two-country, perfectly-competitive trade model to examine how the liberalization of product and factor markets affects the ownership structure of firms. In our model, managers decide whether or not to integrate...

We study frictionless matching models in large production economies with and without market imperfections and/or incentive problems. We provide necessary and sufficient distribution-free conditions for monotone matching which depend on the relationship between what we call the segregation payoff...

We construct a general equilibrium model of firm formation in which organization is endogenous. Incentive-based wealth effects arises from lower bounds on wealth and utility, and these affect the way in which different organizational forms can divide the proceeds of production. Individuals may...

Little is known theoretically, and even less empirically, about the relationship between firm boundaries and the allocation of decision rights within firms. We develop a model in which firms choose which suppliers to integrate and whether to delegate decisions to integrated suppliers. We test...

We construct a general equilibrium model of firm formation in which organization is endogenous. Incentive-based wealth effects arises from lower bounds on wealth and utility, and these affect the way in which different organizational forms can divide the proceeds of production. Individuals may...

We present sufficient conditions for monotone matching in environments where utility is not fully transferable between partners. These conditions involve complementarity in types not only of the total payoff to a match, as in the transferable utility case, but also in the degree of...

We show that vertical integration decisions of managers may affect adversely consumers even in the absence of monopoly power in either supply or product markets. This effect is most likely to come about when demand is initially high and there is a negative supply shock or when demand is low and...

We embed a simple incomplete-contracts model of organization design in a standard two-country perfectly-competitive trade model to examine how the liberalization of product and factor markets affects the ownership structure of firms. In our model, managers decide whether or not to integrate...

We develop an incomplete-contracts model to jointly study firm boundaries and the al-location of decision rights within them. Integration has an option value: it gives firm owners authority to delegate or centralize decision rights, depending on who can best solve problems that may arise in the...