In a multilateral bargaining problem with one buyer and two heterogeneous sellers owning perfectly complementary units, we find that there exists an equilibrium which leads to inefficient delays when the buyer negotiates with the higher-valuation seller first and where players are extremely...

This paper studies a non-cooperative bargaining problem with one buyer and many sellers, focussing on the tension between the complementarity intrinsic to such a setup and efficiency. We address this problem in a very general setup with a technology that allows for variable degrees of...

This paper studies a non-cooperative bargaining problem with one buyer and many sellers, focussing on the tension between the complementarity intrinsic to such a setup and efficiency. We address this problem in a very general setup with a technology that allows for variable degrees of...

This article characterizes the conditions under which holdout (i.e. bargaining inefficiency) may, or may not be significant in a two-sided, one-buyer-many-seller model with complementarity. Our central result is that the severity of holdout (i.e. inefficiency) is critically dependent on three...

This paper characterizes the conditions under which holdout (i.e. bargaining inefficiency) may, or may not be significant in a two-sided, one-buyer-many-seller model with complementarity. We address this problem in a very general setup with a bargaining protocol that is symmetric and allows for...

Monetary Policy Committees differ in the way the interest rate proposal is preparedand presented in the policy meeting. In this paper we show analytically how differentarrangements could affect the voting behaviour of individual MPC members andtherefore policy outcomes. We then apply our results...

Negotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer.In a large-scale internet experiment, we investigate whether a 24-hour coolingoffperiod leads to fewer rejections in ultimatum bargaining. We conduct astandard cash treatment and a lottery treatment, where subjects...

The paper examines the Porter and induced-innovation hypotheses in a firm model where: (i) the firmhas a vintage capital technology with two complementary factors, energy and capital ; (ii) scrappingis endogenous; (iii) technological progress is energy-saving and endogenous through purposive...

We analyse a model of two-sided matching and incentive contracts where expertinvestors (venture capitalists) with different monitoring capacities are matched withfirms with different levels of initial wealth. Firms do not have sufficient start-upcapital to cover their project costs and hence,...

We consider a cooperative model of bargaining where the location of thedisagreement point may be uncertain. Based on the maximin criterion, we formulate anex ante effciency condition and characterize the class of bargaining solutions satisfyingthis axiom...