Showing 1 - 10 of 62
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010237007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010237009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009775547
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010502101
This article establishes versions of Moulin's (Public Choice 35:437-455, 1980) characterizations of various classes of strategy-proof social choice functions when the domain consists of all profiles of single-peaked preferences on an arbitrary subset of the real line. Two results are established...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317101
Tax competition between two governments who choose nonlinear income tax schedules to maximize the average utility of its residents when skills are unobservable and labor is perfectly mobile is examined. We show that there are no Nash equilibria in which there is a skill type that pays positive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274900
For exchange economies with classical economic preferences, it is shown that any strategy-proof social choice function that selects Pareto optimal outcomes cannot guarantee everyone a consumption bundle bounded away from the origin. This result demonstrates that there is a fundamental conflict...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005459255
A desirable property of a voting procedure is that it be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a cadidate for election. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica,2001) have established a number of theorems which demonstrate that this condition is incompatible with some other desirable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005459264
Serge Kolm's "epistemic counterfactual principle" says that a social choice only needs to be made from the actual feasible set of alternatives given the actual preference profile, but it must be justified by the choices that would have been made in appropriate counterfactual choice situations....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005459270
This article reconsiders the Harsanyi--Sen debate concerning whether Harsanyi is justified in interpreting his Aggregation and Impartial Observer Theorems as providing axiomatizations of utilitarianism. Sen's criticism and its formalization by Weymark are based on the claim that von...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005459272