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We study dynamic optimal taxation in a class of economies with private information. Constrained optimal allocations in these environments are complicated and history-dependent. Yet, we show that they can be implemented as competitive equilibria in market economies supplemented with simple tax...
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This paper studies optimal taxation of entrepreneurial capital with private information and multiple assets. Entrepreneurial activity is subject to a dynamic moral hazard problem and entrepreneurs face idiosyncratic capital risk. We first characterize the optimal allocation subject to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466246
This paper studies the impact of changing trends in female labor supply on productivity, TFP growth and aggregate business cycles. We find that the growth in women's labor supply and relative productivity added substantially to TFP growth from the early 1980s, even if it depressed average labor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479606
We bring together the theories of duality and dynamic programming. We show that the dual of a separable dynamic optimization problem can be recursively decomposed. We provide a dual version of the principle of optimality and give conditions under which the dual Bellman operator is a contraction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011188029
A large positive literature emphasizes the role of technological change in driving the demand for skill and talent. We consider the normative implications of such technical change for policy design.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011188050
This paper considers optimal social insurance in a dynamic moral hazard economy. The existing literature has focussed on environments in which a planner and a population of agents share the same discount factor. A key finding is that agents are then almost surely immiserated; their welfare is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005073567
We consider a dynamic moral hazard economy inhabited by a planner and a population of privately informed agents. We assume that the planner and the agents share the same discount factor, but that the planner cannot commit. We show that optimal allocations in such settings solve the problems of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005073620