Showing 1 - 10 of 25
A polluted river network is populated with agents (e.g., firms, villages, municipalities, or countries) located upstream and downstream. This river network must be cleaned, the costs of which must be shared among the agents. We model this problem as a cost sharing problem on a tree network....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015232082
A polluted river network is populated with agents (e.g., firms, villages, municipalities, or countries) located upstream and downstream. This river network must be cleaned, the costs of which must be shared among the agents. We model this problem as a cost sharing problem on a tree network....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011112733
A river carries pollutants to people living along it if it is polluted. To make the water in the river clean, some costs are incurred. This poses a question of how to split the costs of cleaning the whole river among the agents located along it. To answer this question, we resort to the two main...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012734727
For a tolled highway where consecutive sections allow vehicles enter and exit unrestrictedly, we propose a simple toll pricing method. We show that the method is the unique method that satisfies the properties of Transit-proofness (No Merging or Splitting) and Cost Recovery. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013156615
This paper considers the cost sharing problem on a fixed tree network. It provides a characterization of the family of cost sharing methods satisfying the axioms of Additivity and the Independence of Irrelevant Costs. Additivity is a classical axiom. The Independence of Irrelevant Costs axiom is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010687819
This paper considers a modified principal-agent environment, where principals have options to either incentivize agents, or trigger agents' reciprocity. Because the production is uncertain, principals' fixed rate transfer can be easily interpreted as good intention. Theory suggests that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012932431
This paper examines self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) in an open economy environment. Using an extended model of Barrett (1994), we show that: (i) equilibrium tariff is positive; (ii) the endogenously determined size and the effectiveness of an multilateral IEA are the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014204349
This article examines the relationship between cost reduction and public goods effect of research joint ventures (RJVs) and strategic entry deterrence. R&D is process innovation à laKamien, Muller and Zang (1992) and R&D cost sharing between the incumbent and the entrant in a RJV can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014174969
We analyze how the precision of a firm’s product safety testing affects its pricing strategies and the associated profit implications under strict product liability with a partial liability specification. We consider a signaling game where a firm with private product safety information chooses...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014081098
We establish a new envelope theorem in which the choice variables are discrete and the objective function and the constraints are Lipschitz continuous with respect to the parameters. The parameters can be ?nite or in?nite dimensional vectors in a Banach space. In an application, we revisit the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010942044