Proper equilibrium plays a prominent role in the literature on non-cooperative games. The underlying thought experiment is, however, unsatisfying, as it gives no justification for its fundamental idea that severe mistakes are made with a significantly smaller probability than innocuous ones. In...

Fall back equilibrium is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. In the underlying thought experiment each player faces the possibility that, after all players decided on their action, his chosen action turns out to be blocked. Therefore, each player has to decide beforehand on a back-up...

This paper analyses the role of transfer payments and strategic con tracting within two-person strategic form games with monetary pay-offs. First, it introduces the notion of transfer equilibrium as a strategy combination for which individual stability can be supported by allowing the...

A cooperative situation is characterized by a group of players choosing from a set of alternatives, where each alternative results in a joint cost. In this paper we assume that an alternative with minimum total cost will be chosen and we focus on the corresponding cost allocation problem by...

This article characterizes the per capita nucleolus for bankruptcy games as a bankruptcy rule. This rule, called the cligths rule, is based on the wellknown constrained equal awards principle. The essential feature of the rule however is that, for each bankruptcy problem, it takes into account a...

A symmetric network consists of a set of positions and a set of bilateral links between these positions. Examples of such networks are exchange networks, communication networks, disease transmission networks, control networks etc. For every symmetric network we define a cooperative transferable...

In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy. Two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies are...