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This paper proposes an implicit control mechanism of managers inside the firm. We argue that the need to motivate workers may make it beneficial for a self-interested, short-sighted manager to pursue long-run viability of the firm. When the firm is in a stable environment, this implicit control...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002868650
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011757388
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We conduct a discourse analysis of the Bank of Japan's Monthly Report and examine its characteristics in relation to business cycles. We find that the difference between the number of positive and negative expressions in the reports leads the leading index of the economy by approximately three...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012996817
We investigate strategic information transmission with communication error, or noise. Our main finding is that adding noise can improve welfare. With quadratic preferences and a uniform type distribution, welfare can be raised for almost every bias level by introducing a sufficiently small...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702289
This paper proposes an implicit control mechanism of managers inside the firm. We argue that the need to motivate workers may make it beneficial for a self-interested, short-sighted manager to pursue long-run viability of the firm. When the firm is in a stable environment, this implicit control...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332257
We investigate strategic information transmission with communication error, or noise. Our main finding is that adding noise can improve welfare. With quadratic preferences and a uniform type distribution, welfare can be raised for almost every bias level by introducing a sufficiently small...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599393
This paper studies information transmission subject to anonymity requirements and communication in public good provision without transfers. The structure of informative equilibria under anonymity or in public good provision can di¤er substantially from that of direct one-to-one communication,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005369082