We show that firms located geographically close to one another share a similar probability of having staggered boards (or classified boards), an effect probably due to investor clientele, local competition, and social interactions. We then exploit the variation across the zip codes in the...

Because religious piety induces individuals to be more honest and risk-averse, it makes managers less likely to exploit shareholders, thereby mitigating the agency conflict and potentially influencing governance arrangements. We exploit the variation in religious piety across U.S. counties and...

Agency theory suggests that CEOs view dividends unfavorably because dividend payouts deprive them of the free cash flow they could otherwise exploit. Using Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer's (2011) CEO pay slice (CPS) to measure CEO power, we find that an increase in CEO power by one standard...

Prior research shows that religion promotes honesty. Honesty in turn motivates managers to view an expropriation from shareholders as self-serving, opportunistic, and unethical, thereby alleviating the agency conflict. Religious piety is thus expected to discourage agency-driven acquisitions...

Using an event study approach, we seek to estimate the market value investors placed on Steve Jobs by investigating the stock market reactions to his death. In the three-day window surrounding his death, the estimated cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are -5.76%. Given the market capitalization...

We provide evidence on the effect of corporate governance on the extent of corporate risk-taking. Provided by the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), our governance metrics are among the most comprehensive in the literature. Our results show that firms with more effective governance...

We explore the effect of religious piety on corporate social responsibility (CSR). Prior research links religion to honesty and risk aversion. Accordingly, religion induces managers to be more honest and likely view as opportunistic and unethical an exploitation of other stakeholders. Risk...

Motivated by the on-going debate on the costs and benefits of CSR, we explore how talented managers view CSR investments. Based on nearly 20,000 observations across 17 years, our evidence reveals a non-monotonic effect of managerial talent on CSR. Exploiting a novel measure of managerial ability...

Motivated by agency theory, we investigate the effect of board size on corporate outcomes. To address endogeneity, we exploit the variations in the director-age populations across the states in the U.S. We argue that firms with access to a larger pool of potential directors tend to have larger...

We explore the role of powerful CEOs on the extent of risk-taking, using Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer's (2011) CEO pay slice (CPS). Based on more than 12,000 observations over 20 years (1992-2012), our results reveal a non-monotonic association. In particular, relatively less powerful CEOs...