We study optimized monetary and fiscal feedback policy rules. The setup is a conventional New Keynesian DSGE model calibrated to match data from the euro area. Our aim is to welfare rank alternative tax-spending policy instruments used for shock stabilization and/or debt consolidation when, at...

We welfare rank various tax-spending policies. The setup is a New Keynesian model of a semi-small open economy featuring sovereign risk premia and loss of monetary policy independence. The model is calibrated to match data from the Italian economy 2001-2011. We compute various optimized...

We build a new Keynesian DSGE model consisting of two heterogeneous countries participating in a monetary union. We study how public debt consolidation in a country with high debt (like Italy) affects welfare in a country with solid public finances (like Germany). Our results show that debt...

This paper studies the difference between public production and public finance of public goods in a dynamic general equilibrium setup. By public finance, we mean that the public good is produced by private providers with the government financing their costs. When the model is calibrated to match...

In this paper, we study the aggregate and distributional implications of a smaller public sector in the euro area. By a smaller public sector, we mean a reduction in public debt and/or cuts in public spending, when such changes in fiscal policy are accommodated by adjustment in various taxes....

This paper incorporates an uncoordinated struggle for extra fiscal favors into an otherwise standard Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model. This reflects the popular belief that interest groups compete for privileged transfers and tax treatment at the expense of the general public...

This paper incorporates competition for fiscal transfers (or, equivalently, rent seeking from state coffers) into a standard general equilibrium model of economic growth and endogenously chosen fiscal policy. The government generates tax revenues, but then each selfinterested individual agent...