This paper examines how the opportunity costs of the leaders of a national protest movement, and the intrinsic pacifism of the occupier, affect the nature of the movement against occupation. A two-stage game is modeled, in which a protest leader and the external occupier fight over the control...

This paper extends Gupta (2010), which proposes a mechanism for the structuring of international institutions for the efficient provision of global security. In that paper, the level of threat by a rogue nation was assumed as being exogenously determined. This paper uses a similar framework to...

This paper examines how the opportunity costs of the leaders of a national protest movement, and the intrinsic hawkishness or pacifism of the occupier, affect the nature of the movement against occupation. A two-stage game is modeled, in which a protest leader and an external occupier fight over...

This paper proposes a mechanism for structuring international institutions to efficiently provision global security against the threat of a rogue nation. The effects of security effort by an alliance member are assumed to be non-rival and non-excludable for other members. Specifically, this...

This paper proposes a mechanism for structuring international institutions to efficiently provision global security against the threat of a rogue nation. The effects of security effort by an alliance member are assumed to be non-rival and non-excludable for other members. Specifically, this...

This paper examines how the opportunity costs of the leaders of a national protest movement, and the intrinsic pacifism of the occupier, affect the nature of the movement against occupation. A two-stage game is modeled, in which a protest leader and the external occupier fight over the control...

This paper extends Gupta (2010), which proposes a mechanism for the structuring of international institutions for the efficient provision of global security. In that paper, the level of threat by a rogue nation was assumed as being exogenously determined. This paper uses a similar framework to...

From marketing and advertising to political campaigning and court proceedings, contending parties expend resources to persuade an audience of the correctness of their view. We examine how the probability of persuading the audience depends on the resources expended by the parties, so that...

How can the West’s economic and political polarization be explained? We argue that persuasive lobbying at various levels of government leads to systematic deviations of policies from those desired by the majority. Implemented policies diverge from the majority position despite centripetal...