We show that firms located geographically close to one another share a similar probability of having staggered boards (or classified boards), an effect probably due to investor clientele, local competition, and social interactions. We then exploit the variation across the zip codes in the...

Prior research shows that religion promotes honesty. Honesty in turn motivates managers to view an expropriation from shareholders as self-serving, opportunistic, and unethical, thereby alleviating the agency conflict. Religious piety is thus expected to discourage agency-driven acquisitions...

We explore the effect of economic policy uncertainty on board gender diversity. Prior research shows that female directors play a beneficial role. The advantage of board gender diversity should be particularly helpful when firms have to navigate an uncertain environment. So, we hypothesize that...

We examine the interactions among ownership structure, liquidity, and corporate governance in an important emerging market. The results suggest that firms with more concentrated ownership experience significantly lower stock liquidity. Large shareholders are assumed to possess private...

Because religious piety induces individuals to be more honest and risk-averse, it makes managers less likely to exploit shareholders, thereby mitigating the agency conflict and potentially influencing governance arrangements. We exploit the variation in religious piety across U.S. counties and...

Agency theory suggests that CEOs view dividends unfavorably because dividend payouts deprive them of the free cash flow they could otherwise exploit. Using Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer's (2011) CEO pay slice (CPS) to measure CEO power, we find that an increase in CEO power by one standard...

Purpose: Exploiting a novel measure of innovation, we investigate whether independent directors improve innovation efficiency. This novel measure of innovation captures the extent to which the firm generates revenue from its R&D and is therefore more economically meaningful. We also employ a...

Purpose: Capitalizing on a unique measure of takeover susceptibility principally based on the staggered implementation of state laws, we explore the takeover market’s effect on managerial ownership. The market for corporate control, often known as the takeover market, is an important external...

PurposeWe contribute to the debate in the literature about generalist CEOs by exploring the effect of board governance on CEO general managerial ability, focusing on one of the most crucial aspects of the board of directors, board size. Prior research shows that smaller boards constitute a more...

AbstractPurpose - Exploiting two novel measures of takeover vulnerability and asset redeployability, we investigate the effect of the takeover market on redeployable assets. Redeployable assets are those with alternative uses. Asset redeployability is a crucial concept in the literature on...