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This paper analyzes strategic bargaining in negotiations between non-monolithic players, i.e., agents starting negotiations can split up in smaller entities during the bargaining process. We show that the possibility of scission in the informed coalition implies that it loses its information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027700
We propose a framework to analyze coalition formation with heterogeneous agents. Existing literature defines stability conditions that do not ensure that, once an agent decides to sign an agreement, the enlarged coalition is feasible. Defining the concepts of refraction and exchanging, we set up...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029312
This article determines the conditions under which the Southern countries should act together, or separately, while negotiating with the North about climate change policy and about the conditions for future Southern engagement. The paper models the international negotiations with complete and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014031100
We propose a framework to analyze coalition formation with heterogeneous agents. Existing literature defines stability conditions that do not ensure that, once an agent decides to sign an agreement, the enlarged coalition is feasible. Defining the concepts of refraction and exchanging, we set up...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011602849
This article determines the conditions under which the Southern countries should act together, or separately, while negotiating with the North about climate change policy and about the conditions for future Southern engagement. The paper models the international negotiations with complete and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011589628
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013348764
This article provides a non-technical overview of important results of the game theoretical literature on the formation and stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) on transboundary pollution control. It starts out by sketching features of first and second best solutions to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011600452
Standard non-cooperative game theoretical models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) draw a pessimistic picture of the prospective of successful cooperation: only small coalitions are stable that achieve only little. However, there also exist IEAs with higher participation and more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011602768
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015077703
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001910304