Some agents are more accurate than others in estimating the best policy. The more accurately an agent estimates a policy's effects, the more he will resist biases, such as bribes from a special interest. Thus, a special interest needs to pay a larger bribe to an accurate agent than to an...

We construct a simple model of fiscal competition taking `rent-seeking' behavior of local governments into account and estimate a policy reaction function based on the model. We consider the scale of public input as each local government's policy tool. Local autonomies' method of seeking central...

We examine how international coordination between countries generates a trend to establish an international institution for the provision of global public goods. In the present model, the forces creating movement to international agreement are a politician's opportunistic motive for re-election,...

Two districts with divergent productivity levels engage in policy-making on the provision of local public goods that enhance future income and hence create a dynamic linkage across periods. The policy choices of district representatives are derived under alternative fiscal systems, and the...

This paper develops a theory of consumer boycotts. Some consumers care not only aboutthe products they buy but also about whether the firm behaves ethically. Other consumersdo not care about the behavior of the firm but yet may like to give the impression of beingethical consumers. Consequently,...

An examination of how increased turnover among legislators in the fifty U.S. states affects fiscal policy and economic growth finds that it makes legislators short-sighted. Turnover increases the size of government by increasing the shares of both total spending and taxes in income. In...

This paper develops a theory of consumer boycotts. Some consumers care not only about the products they buy but also about whether the firm behaves ethically. Other consumers do not care about the behavior of the firm but yet may like to give the impression of being ethical consumers...

Consider a principal who appoints an agent. Let the agent potentially serve for a sufficiently long time that one principal is replaced by another over this period. Suppose also that the quality of the agent appointed increases with the effort the incumbent principal devotes to hiring. Then the...

Consider a public project which produces a consumption good and which benefits future generations. Let a conventional cost-benefit analysis find that it gives higher benefits than projects it would dis-place in the private sector. Voters may nevertheless oppose the public project: the...