We consider in this paper a duopoly competing in quantities and where�firms can invest in R&D to control their emissions. We distinguish between effort carried out to acquire first-hand knowledge (original R&D)and effort to develop an absorptive capacity to be able to capture part of the...

In this paper, we consider a duopoly competing in quantity, where firms can invest in R&D to control their emissions. We distinguish between efforts carried out to acquire first-hand knowledge (inventive R&D) and efforts made to develop an absorptive capacity to be able to capture part of the...

We consider a duopoly competing in quantity, where firms can invest in both innovative and absorptive R&D to reduce their unit production cost, and where they benefit from free R&D spillovers between them. We analyze the case where firms act non cooperatively and the case where they cooperate by...

In this paper we develop a model to analyze, in a dynamic framework, how countries join international environmental agreements (IEAs). In the model, where countries suffer from the same environmental damage as a result of the total global emissions, a non-signatory country decides its emissions...

In this paper we develop a model to analyze, in a dynamic framework, how countries join international environmental agreements (IEAs). In the model, where countries suffer from the same environmental damage as a result of the total global emissions, a non-signatory country decides its emissions...

We introduce learning in a dynamic game of international pollution, with ecological uncertainty. We characterize and compare the feedback non-cooperative emissions strategies of players when the players do not know the distribution of ecological uncertainty but they gain information (learn)...

We consider a duopoly competing in quantity, where firms can invest in both innovative and absorptive R&D to reduce their unit production cost, and where they benefit from free R&D spillovers between them. We analyze the case where firms act non cooperatively and the case where they cooperate by...

We consider in this paper a duopoly competing in quantities and where�firms can invest in R&D to control their emissions. We distinguish between effort carried out to acquire first-hand knowledge (original R&D)and effort to develop an absorptive capacity to be able to capture part of the...

A Public Disclosure Program (PDP) is compared to a traditional environmental regulation (exemplified by a tax/subsidy) in a simple dynamic framework. A PDP aims at revealing the environmental record of firms to the public. This information affects its image (goodwill or brand equity), and...

Many authors have put into evidence the relations that could exist between the market structure and some demand characteristics for an industry product, on the one hand, and the intensity of advertising undertaken by the same industry on the other hand. Certains auteurs ont mis en évidence les...