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We exploit the information content of option prices to construct a novel measure of bank tail-risk. We document a persistent increase in tail-risk for the U.S. banking industry following the global financial crisis, except for banks designated as systemically important by the Dodd-Frank Act. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013219652
The U.S. government uses its voting power to direct IMF funds to countries where U.S. banks stand to lose the most from sovereign default -- a de facto bailout. Consistent with this, the likelihood a defaulting sovereign is granted an IMF loan is increasing in U.S. banks' exposure to that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012838768
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National Basketball Association (NBA) contracting rules provide plausibly exogenous variation in career concerns near contract end. We use this setting to study how individual career concerns affect risk-taking behavior and can sabotage team performance. Using the frequency and duration of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012856480
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Do people "vote with their feet" due to a lack of political competition? We formalize the theory of political competition and migration to show that increasing political competition lowers political rent leading to net in-migration. Our empirical application using US data supports this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015235228
We model and predict that politicians have incentives to delay bank failure in election years and that this incentive is exacerbated if the election is close. Our empirical application using the US data supports these predictions. At the bank level, we show that bank failure in an election year...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015235229
We exploit exogenous variation in the timing of gubernatorial elections to study the timing of bank failure in the US. Using a Cox proportional hazard model, we show that bank failure is about 45% less likely in the year leading up to an election. Political control can explain all of this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015238022
We exploit exogenous variation in the timing of gubernatorial elections to study the timing of bank failure in the US. Using hazard analysis, we show that bank failure is about 45% less likely in the year leading up to an election. Political control (i.e. lack of competition) can explain all of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015239460