This paper examines allocation of local public goods over jurisdictions (villages) with individuals with identical tastes and different incomes, in a model with democratic institutions and majority rule. The median voter (in income) in each jurisdiction determines the probability of re-election...

This paper examines how citizens decide on their reservation utilities (expectations), in a model with democratic institutions and majority rule. If all individuals have identical incomes, then political competition amongst citizens, to attract resources from the government brings reservation...

This paper examines allocation of local public goods over jurisdictions (villages) with individuals with identical tastes and different incomes, in a model with democratic institutions and majority rule. The median voter (in income) in each jurisdiction determines the probability of re-election...

In a probabilistic voting model with three jurisdictions with residents with different income levels, we demonstrate that it is always optimal to distribute tax revenues as public good to only the residents of richest and median income jurisdictions. In this context, we compare the overall...

This paper examines allocation of local public good over three jurisdictions with individuals with heterogeneous tastes, in a model with democratic institutions and majority rule. When electoral uncertainty across individuals is perfectly correlated, the jurisdiction with the median voter gets...