We offer a novel view of employee discounts and in kind compensation. In our theory, bundling perks and cash compensation allows a firm to extract information rents from employees who have private information about their preferences for the perk and about their outside opportunities. We show...

We analyze whether ease and speed of entry can mitigate the anti-competititve effects of a merger, in a dynamic model of endogenous merger. In our model, if new firms can enter quickly, it is more likely that merger is motivated by efficiency as opposed to increased market power. Thus, there is...

Many organizations attempt to manage agency problems not with incentive contracts but by keeping the principal involved in the decision process, that is, by limiting delegation. This paper develops a model to investigate the economics of several decision processes that are commonly used to set...

Many organizations attempt to manage agency problems not with incentive contracts but by keeping the principal involved in the decision process, that is, by limiting delegation. This paper develops a model to investigate the economics of several decision processes that are commonly used to set...

This paper considers product recall under a perfect regime of strict liability. We show that safety is under supplied given output due to an under internalization of infra-marginal units. If we add a mandatory refund with a possible penalty fee in the event that the product turns out to be...