Although industry deregulation leads to changes in the scale and scope of the duties of the board of directors, little is known about the changes in incentives for directors surrounding such events. The deregulation of the U.S. banking industry and associated technological and regulatory changes...

After a large bank merger the compensation of the surviving bank's CEO often increases materially. Theories of executive compensation based on managerial productivity and optimal incentives suggest that changes in CEO compensation are related to the potential gains from merger. Alternatively,...

We examine the impact of venture capitalist (VC) involvement, quality and exit on corporate governance structures at the time of and subsequent to an initial public offering (IPO). Venture capital backed firms utilize governance structures with greater levels of monitoring at the time of an IPO...

Using a unique dataset of corporate philanthropy, we find that direct giving activities are positively associated with more collaborative and original innovation. In contrast, our results do not hold for corporate foundations' contributions. Our results suggest that much of what is ostensibly...

We examine the response of prosocial employees and boards of directors to corporate misconduct. We develop several proxies for the presence of prosocial employees and directors, based on the density of social networks and social capital in the county of the firms' headquarters and companies'...

We investigate corporate governance of Japanese banks from the 1970s to the 1990s. In spite of economic shocks to the operating environment of Japanese banks over this period, there are few mergers, failures, and other changes in ownership and control. We also find that executive turnover is...

We examine whether firms utilize governance systems and increased monitoring mechanisms when information asymmetry and managerial discretion are limited. Given that such monitoring is costly, we expect regulated firms to use less monitoring if regulation substitutes for governance. Using data...

We document an economically significant relation between director turnover and prior firm performance. This relation manifests in idiosyncratic stock returns consistent with relative performance evaluation and the monitoring of actions attributable to directors. The director turnover-performance...

We examine long-term firm-advisor relations using an extended history of debt, equity, and merger transactions. Hard-to-value firms are more likely to maintain dedicated advisor relations (underwriters or merger advisors). Firms that retain predominantly one advisor over their entire transaction...

Director selection is crucial in corporate governance, but little is known about the relative importance of individual director attributes in the selection process. We examine the motives for director selection using the empirical setting of mergers, which offers a well-defined pool of...