We analyze a principal-agent setting with multiple sources of contracting information in which the signal from each source can be unmistakably interpreted as "good" or "bad" news. We then ask whether it is best to condition the acquisition of one of the information sources on whether the earlier...

Corporate choice is expected to reflect rational behavior and yet there is much anecdotal evidence suggesting the opposite. Often the accounting system plays a major part in such stories. Aligning incentives has always been one of the main concerns of the accounting system. Accounting control...

Corporate choice is expected to reflect rational behavior and yet there is much anecdotal evidence suggesting the opposite. Often the accounting system plays a major part in such stories. Aligning incentives has always been one of the main concerns of the accounting system. Accounting control...

We report on a panel discussion at the 2001 CMU Accounting Mini-conference under the title "Intellectual Foundations of Accounting." We provide a background and the motivation for the discussion and present the remarks by the four panelists. A number of perspectives are taken. Sunder emphasizes...

We analyze the optimal behavior of an organization when its employees can manipulate the organization's accounting system to their private advantage. We find that the organization may benefit by helping its employees manipulate the system. This help can reduce the employees' private returns from...

GAAP mandates a variety of departures from historical cost valuation. We consider a simple model that produces corresponding variety, depending on prevailing regulatory objectives and economic conditions. The model entails entrepreneurial investment in an asset followed by private information...