We investigate optimal strategies for a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) insurer to manage its business risk through not only equity investment and proportional reinsurance but also trading derivatives of the equity. We obtain the optimal strategies in closed-form and quantify the value of...

Basis risk arises in a number of financial and insurance risk management problems when the hedging assets do not perfectly match the underlying asset in a hedging program. Notable examples in insurance include the hedging for longevity risks, weather index based insurance products, variable...

We study optimal buying and selling strategies in target zone models. In these models the price is modeled by a diffusion process which is reflected at one or more barriers. Such models arise for example when a currency exchange rate is kept above a certain threshold due to central bank...

We consider a stochastic game between a trader and a central bank in a target zone market with a lower currency peg. This currency peg is maintained by the central bank through the generation of permanent price impact, thereby aggregating an ever increasing risky position in foreign reserves. We...

We formulate and solve a multi-player stochastic differential game between financial agents who seek to cost-efficiently liquidate their position in a risky asset in the presence of jointly aggregated transient price impact, along with taking into account a common general price predicting...

We consider a stochastic game between three types of players: an inside trader, noise traders and a market maker. In a similar fashion to Kyle's model, we assume that the insider first chooses the size of her market-order and then the market maker determines the price by observing the total...

We consider a class of optimal liquidation problems where the agent's transactions create transient price impact driven by a Volterra-type propagator along with temporary price impact. We formulate these problems as minimization of a revenue-risk functionals, where the agent also exploits...