We model competition for liquidity provision between high-frequency traders (HFTs) and slower execution algorithms designed to minimize transaction costs for buy-side institutions (B-Algos). Under continuous pricing, B-Algos dominate liquidity provision by using aggressive limit orders to...

We model competition for liquidity provision between high-frequency traders (HFTs) and slower execution algorithms designed to minimize transaction costs for buy-side institutions (B-Algos). Under continuous pricing, B-Algos dominate liquidity provision by using aggressive limit orders to...

Financial regulations and clientele segmentation explain the proliferation of order types on stock exchanges. Plain market and limit orders lose money, indicating that informed traders use complex orders. Fifty-seven percent of trading volume comes from non-routable orders, which are designed to...

Financial regulations and clientele segmentation explain the proliferation of order types on stock exchanges. Plain market and limit orders lose money, indicating that informed traders use complex orders. Fifty-seven percent of trading volume comes from non-routable orders, which are designed to...

Stock exchange operators compete for order flow by setting "make" fees for limit orders and "take" fees for market orders. When traders quote continuous prices, they can choose prices that perfectly neutralize any fee division, and traders stream to the exchange with the lowest total fee. The...

We show that queueing rationing under price controls drives high-frequency trading. A one-cent uniform tick size (minimal price variation) creates rents and generates queues for liquidity provision, particularly for securities with lower prices (larger relative tick sizes). Speed rations the...