We contribute to the post-crisis literature on macroeconomic stability by arguing that polycentric banking systems can better achieve stability than monocentric systems. Building on the theories of E. Ostrom, we engage the literature on free banking systems to show that these systems met the...

The problem of financial stability is political and institutional, rather than narrowly economic. To achieve a more resilient financial system, we need to pay attention to the incentives of actors who have the power to act discretionarily, and to the knowledge limitations of such actors in the...

This paper revisits the debates about the meaning of economic efficiency, and the moral dilemmas associated with using Kaldor-Hicks efficiency or Pareto efficiency for policy analysis. I lay out the best case for efficiency as meta-value, and highlight that it still does not allow us to evade...

This paper explains how to use the calculus of consent framework to think more rigorously about self-governance, and applies this framework to the issue of evaluating federal regulatory agencies. Robust political economy is the idea that institutions should be designed to work well even under...

Over the past four decades, across the OECD countries and beyond, we observe a simultaneous increase (a) in the number, the budgets and the staffing of regulatory agencies, as well as the number of regulations, and (b) of economic liberalization, as measured by economic freedom and doing...

The success of the scientific community challenges in many ways our theories of social cooperation and public goods production. It is a very large scale, decentralized, international organization lacking any central management or a formalized legislative or rule-enforcement body. Even the...