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We consider the problem faced by a firm that receives highly differentiated products in an online fashion. The firms needs to price these products to sell them to its customer base. Products are described by vectors of features and the market value of each product is linear in the values of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013242948
We combine theory and empirics to (i) show that some buyers in online advertising markets are financially constrained and (ii) demonstrate how to design auctions that take into account such financial constraints. We use data from a field experiment where reserve prices were randomized on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012852854
We study the problem of designing dynamic double auctions for two-sided markets in which a platform intermediates the trade between one seller offering independent items to multiple buyers, repeatedly over a finite horizon, when agents have private values. Motivated by online platforms for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013227581
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015271585
We show that the class of preferences satisfying the Gross Substitutes condition of Kelso and Crawford (1982) is strictly larger than the class of Endowed Assignment Valuations of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), thus resolving the open question posed by the latter paper. In particular, our result...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673201
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012515932
We study revenue maximization through sequential posted-price (SPP) mechanisms in single-dimensional settings with n buyers and independent but not necessarily identical value distributions. We construct the SPP mechanisms by considering the best of two simple pricing rules: one that imitates...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012828278
We study the dynamic mechanism design problem of a seller who repeatedly sells independent items to a buyer with private values. In this setting, the seller could potentially extract the entire buyer surplus by running efficient auctions and charging an upfront participation fee at the beginning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014125901
We show that the class of preferences satisfying the Gross Substitutes condition of Kelso and Crawford (1982) is strictly larger than the class of Endowed Assignment Valuations of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), thus resolving the open question posed by the latter paper. In particular, our result...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599555
We show that the class of preferences satisfying the Gross Substitutes condition of Kelso and Crawford (1982) is strictly larger than the class of Endowed Assignment Valuations of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), thus resolving the open question posed by the latter paper. In particular, our result...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010896846