Estimating antitrust risk is fundamental to identifying, proposing, and pricing deals. A more informed understanding of what to expect when meeting with agency staff and leadership will help antitrust lawyers and economists (or other consultants) anticipate the critical questions and potential...

This paper seeks to clarify what factors contributed to the macroeconomic gains and losses from privatization in transition economies over the past decade. In contrast to the original "Washington Consensus," which had a tendency to equate change-of-title with privatization, we find that economic...

This paper seeks to clarify what factors contributed to the macroeconomic gains and losses from privatization in transition economies over the past decade. In contrast to the original "Washington Consensus," which had a tendency to equate change-of-title with privatization, we find that economic...

There is perhaps no area in antitrust policy that is more prone to confusion and misunderstandings than enforcement against exclusionary conduct violations. This article develops a framework for understanding anti-competitive conduct policy that is built around three building blocks:...

In comparison to the prior Guidelines, the 2010 Guidelines: (i) de-emphasized market definition; (ii) introduced the concept of upward price pressure (UPP) explicitly into the Guidelines; (iii) maintained focus on potential harm from “coordinated effects” despite what appeared to be its...

We develop a methodology that quantifies from data on itinerary demand consumers' valuations of the characteristics of airline networks, and show that airline network effects are highly valued. We show that these effects are crucial for determining consumer impacts of public policies that affect...

We extend the theory of bilateral vertical contracting to a double moral hazard setting where upstream and downstream firms make complementary investments that enhance demand, downstream firms make fixed investments to enter the downstream market, and contracts are private information and...

A major shortcoming of the growing empirical work on asymmetric information is the inability to separately identify moral hazard from adverse selection. Abbring et. al. (2003) point out that dynamic insurance data can help here, by asking whether consumers have fewer claims when they are at a...