We study corporate hedging during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. We find that hedging programs are fragile. Firms whose lenders suffered losses on their mortgage portfolios were more likely to lose access to over-the-counter derivatives, and this effect was strongest among unrated and below...

We study the loosening of restrictions on the use of leverage, derivatives, and illiquid assets by mutual funds. In contrast to previous studies, we find that the allowance of these complex instruments is associated with poor performance and higher risk. The underperformance is most acute during...

This paper studies whether institutional investors trade on 14 well-documented stock market anomalies. We show that there is an increase in anomaly-based trading when information about the anomalies is readily available through academic publication and the release of necessary accounting data....

We study fund-firm connections that arise when firm executives and directors serve as fund directors. We find that connected funds are significantly more likely to vote with management in proposals with negative ISS recommendations or low shareholder support. As our data shows that management...

The short period of time, from the fourth week of April to the end of May, referred to as the proxy season, has about 333 proposals voted a day relative to 27 proposals voted per day outside the proxy season. The compressed workload results in 17.6% fewer negative recommendations from ISS during...

We examine whether firms exploit enforcement heterogeneity in response to risks and costs arising from investigations by regional Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement offices. We find that firms facing high SEC scrutiny risk are more likely to relocate outside the jurisdiction of...

Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: This study examines activism campaigns where multiple activists simultaneously target the same firm—which we term clustered shareholder activism. Despite the growing influence of shareholder activism on corporate governance, the clustered...

This paper examines the influence corporate executives sitting on mutual fund boards exert on the investment decisions of the fund. Our results show that funds bias their holdings toward the executive's firm. Furthermore, we find that these funds trade informatively in the executive's firm, in...

This paper examines the influence corporate executives sitting on mutual fund boards exert on the investment decisions of the fund. Our results show that funds bias their holdings toward the executive's firm. Furthermore, we find that these funds trade informatively in the executive's firm, in...

We examine ballot order effects in independent director elections. Our results show that down-ballot directors receive considerably less opposition from shareholders. This result holds in a sample where directors are positioned alphabetically on the proxy ballot, and, thus unrelated to the...