The 2014 passage of the Florange Act in France changed an opt-in provision for loyalty shares (allocating a second voting right for shares held at least two years) to an opt-out provision with shareholder approval. We find that before 2014, loyalty shares were popular among small family firms....

Loyalty shares, mechanisms designed to encourage long-term share ownership through disproportional ownership rights, face questions regarding their benefits and costs. We examine these questions through a natural experiment – the passage of the Florange Act in France – which required firms...

We investigate the impact of family control on both the share price level and the decision to split the firm's stock. Low stock prices are associated with higher volatility and have been shown to attract more speculative trading, which may force managers to excessively focus on short-term...

We investigate the influence of founding-family ownership on labor relations using workplace-level data from France. Based on data from labor conflicts during 2004 in workplaces of listed companies, we find that family ownership significantly reduces the duration and the percentage of employees...

We investigate the influence of founding-family ownership on labor relations using workplace-level data from France. Based on data from labor conflicts during 2004 in workplaces of listed companies, we find that family ownership significantly reduces the duration and the percentage of employees...

This paper analyzes the social connections between a firm's chief executive officer (CEO) and its chief financial officer (CFO). We focus on French educational networks and examine the corporate governance and performance of firms whose CEO and CFO attended the same elite college (Grande...

French law mandates that employees of publicly listed companies can elect two types of directors to represent employees. Privatized companies must reserve board seats for directors elected by employees by right of employment, while employee-shareholders can elect a director whenever they hold at...

French law mandates that employees of large publicly listed companies be allowed to elect two types of directors to represent employees. First, partially privatized companies must reserve two or three (depending on board size) board seats for directors elected by employees by right of...

We examine board structure in France, which since 1966 has allowed firms freedom to choose between unitary and two-tier boards. We analyze how this choice relates to characteristics of the firm and its environment. Firms with severe asymmetric information tend to opt for unitary boards; firms...