Limits to arbitrage play a central role in behavioral finance. They are thought to interfere with arbitrage processes so that security prices can deviate from true values for extended periods of time. We describe a recent financial innovation that allows limits to arbitrage to be sidestepped,...

We document the existence of a strategy designed to circumvent limits to arbitrage. Faced with short-sale constraints and noise trader risk, small arbitrageurs publicly reveal their information to induce the target's shareholders (the longs) to sell, thereby accelerating price discovery. Using...

We examine to what extent institutional frictions such as short-sale constraints deter entry into informational arbitrage ex ante and reduce informational efficiency ex post. We focus on small arbitrageurs who target hard-to-short companies with correspondingly high potential for overvaluation....

We study the efficiency of capital allocations at state-controlled and privately owned business groups in China. Using highly granular data on within-group capital transfers, we document stark differences: while private groups allocate more capital to units with better investment opportunities,...

We study the efficiency of capital allocations at state-controlled and privately owned business groups in China. Using highly granular data on within-group capital transfers, we document stark differences: while private groups allocate more capital to units with better investment opportunities,...

We derive conditions for when having a “busy” director on the board is harmful to shareholders and when it is beneficial. Our model allows directors to condition their monitoring choices on their co-directors' choices and to experience positive or negative monitoring synergies across firms....

We study how well-incentivized boards monitor CEOs and whether such monitoring improves performance. Using unique, detailed data on boards' information sets and decisions for a large sample of private-equity-backed firms, we find that gathering information helps boards learn about CEO ability....