We develop a main bank model where the main bank decides whether or not to raise additional funds from the capital market to continue to invest in a borrowing firm when nonmain banks withdraw funds. We show that the threat of withdrawal of nonmain banks is more likely not only to force the main...

We examine renegotiation in a double moral hazard model with an ex ante budget balancing constraint when both the principal and the agent are allowed to make a renegotiation offer even though the principal proposes an initial contract. Under a belief restriction, any perfect-Bayesian equilibrium...

We explore how the timings of compensation payment and contract termination are jointly and optimally determined in a continuous-time principal—agent model under the discretionary termination policy of investors (the principal) when the agent has loss—averse preferences. Our theoretical...

Given that an owner cannot commit to her timing strategy under a manager's hidden action, we consider (i) how the owner's timing decisions to launch a project and to replace the manager or change a project are determined, and (ii) how the optimal compensation contract for the manager is...

This paper considers the role of equity transfer to strategic alliance partners in mitigating the moral hazard problem that occurs if a participating firm faces some possibility of reallocating a part of the resources devoted to the joint project of the strategic alliance or retreating from the...

The recent empirical studies suggest that a change in the policy interest rate has a significant impact on the liquidity management of the banks.Focusing on the role of the interbank market in mitigating a trade-off associated with the cost of precautionary hoarding of liquidity, this paper...

One of the challenges of modern banks is providing uninsured wholesale depositors with a safe haven. We model banks deciding their own capital and liquidity levels in a forwardlooking manner to absorb an exogenous shock to their investment through interbank trading. A regulatory framework...

Banking regulations recognize subordinated debt as capital, mainly because its subordination in payment likely incentivizes investors to determine the interest rate to discipline their bank against taking risk. We challenge the disciplinary view by introducing hybrid-natured investors in...