We show that, on average, product market competition acts as a disciplining force constraining managers from misreporting accounting information. Further, in a quasi-natural experiment that uses shifts in import tariffs to identify intensification of competition, difference-in-difference...

We show that, on average, product market competition acts as a disciplining force constraining managers from misreporting accounting information. Further, in a quasi-natural experiment that uses shifts in import tariffs to identify intensification of competition, difference-in-difference...

We examine how firms' contractual relationships with their employees affect the design of their debt contracts, and their use of financial covenants and pricing grids in particular. Viewing the firm as nexus of both explicit and implicit contractual relationships, we argue that managers...

Using the first and recently available universe of dark pool trading in the U.S. from FINRA, we document trading patterns around scheduled and unscheduled corporate information events. We find that there is more trading in dark pools in the week of earnings announcement as well as analyst...

We show that the 2004 SEC regulation requiring more frequent disclosures from active mutual funds unintendedly increased the profitability of trading by another set of informed investors, namely insiders. Cross-sectional analyses suggest that this increase in insiders' profits is due to mutual...

Using a shock to transparency in a parimutuel betting market, we show that capital flows increase in public information even in markets with largely risk-seeking participants. The evidence indicates that capital allocation decisions are partly a function of behavioral mechanisms such as the...

We provide evidence that bank capitalization and loan-loss reserving jointly determine pro-cyclicality in lending. Using the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 as our context, we document that even banks with high regulatory capital buffers (High RCB banks) reduce lending during the crisis....

Can managers influence the liquidity of their firms' shares? We use plausibly exogenous variation in the supply of public information to show that firms seek to actively shape their information environments by voluntarily disclosing more information than is mandated by market regulations and...

Can managers influence the liquidity of their firms' shares? We use plausibly exogenous variation in the supply of public information to show that firms actively shape their information environments by voluntarily disclosing more information than regulations mandate and that such efforts improve...