This paper studies a dynamic principal-agent setting in which the principal needs to dynamically schedule an agent to work or rest. When the agent is motivated to work, the arrival rate of a Poisson process increases, which increases the principal's payoff. Resting, on the other hand, serves as...

We consider a stylized incentive management problem over an infinite time horizon, where the principal hires an agent to provide services to customers. Customers request service in one of two ways: either via an online or a traditional, offline, channel. The principal does not observe the...

We employ novel methods to investigate optimal project management in a setting plagued by unavoidable setbacks. The contractor can cover up delays from shirking either by making false claims of setbacks or by postponing the reports of real ones. The sponsor induces work and honest reporting via...

We test whether earnings management (like a virus) spreads from firm to firm via board connections of shared directors (virus carriers). We use earnings restatements to identify firms that managed earnings and to identify the period when these firms manipulated earnings. We consider firms as...

We use a social learning perspective to extend our understanding of information technology (IT) investment and return. Specifically, we investigate social learning in the context of interlocks between corporate boards, which allow firms to share knowledge and experiences with respect to their IT...

Consider a setting in which a principal induces effort from an agent to reduce the arrival rate of a Poisson process of adverse events. The effort is costly to the agent, and unobservable to the principal, unless the principal is monitoring the agent. Monitoring ensures effort but is costly to...