This paper proposes a game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic behavior of inc-dec gaming in market-based congestion management (redispatch). We extend existing models by considering incomplete information about competitors' costs and a finite set of providers. We find that these extensions...

This paper discusses a capacity-based redispatch mechanism in which awarded market participants are compensated for their availability for redispatch, rather than activation. The rationale is to develop a market design that prevents so-called 'inc-dec gaming' when including flexible consumers...

This paper proposes a game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic behavior of inc-dec gaming in market-based congestion management (redispatch). We extend existing models by considering incomplete information about competitors’ costs and a finite set of providers. We find that these...

This paper discusses a capacity-based redispatch mechanism in which awarded market participants are compensated for their availability for redispatch, rather than activation. The rationale is to develop a market design that prevents so-called “inc-dec gaming” when including flexible...

This paper proposes a game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic behavior of inc-dec gaming in market-based congestion management (redispatch). We extend existing models by considering incomplete information about competitors’ costs and a finite set of providers. We find that these...

This paper compares import tariffs and import price caps as policy measures to regulate a foreign monopolist. We show that for any positive import tariff there exists a set of price caps each of which Pareto-dominates the given tariff. This result is particularly important in the case of...

Contracts for differences are widely discussed as a cornerstone of Europe’s future electricity market design. In this paper, we make three contributions to the debate. First, we summarize the dispatch and investment distortions that traditional CfDs cause. Second, we propose an alternative CfD...

Contracts for differences are widely discussed as a cornerstone of Europe’s future electricity market design. This is a paper on CfD contract design. We summarize the dispatch and investment distortions that conventional CfDs cause, the patches that are used to overcome these shortcomings, and...

We present a bottom-up electricity market model for Switzerland called Swissmod. It includes a detailed electricity network and hydropower representation. Swissmod captures the features and restrictions of run-of-river, yearly storage and pumped-storage power plants and combines this with a...