This paper constitutes the second part in a series dealing with vNM-Stable sets for (cooperative) linear production games with a continuum of players, see [2]. The coalitional function is generated by r + 1 "production factors" (non atomic measures). R factors are given by orthogonal...

This paper constitues the third part in a series dealing with vNM-Stable Sets, see [2], [3]. We consider (cooperative) linear production games with a continuum of players. The coalitional function is generated by r + 1 "production factors" (non atomic measures). r factors are given by orthogonal...

We consider (cooperative) linear production games with a continuum of players. The coalitional function is generated by r + 1 "production factors" that is, non atomic measures defined on an interval. r of these are orthogonal probabilities which, economically, can be considered as "cornered"...

Within this paper we establish the existence of a vNM-Stable Set for (cooperative) linear production games with a continuum of players. The coalitional function is generated by r+1 "production factors" (non atomic measures). r factors are given by orthogonal probabilities ("cornered" production...

A cephoid is an algebraic ("Minkowski") sum of finitely many prisms in R^n. A cephoidal game is an NTU game the feasible sets of which are cephoids. We provide a version of the Shapley NTU value for such games based on the bargaining solution of Maschler-Perles. -- Cephoids ; Bargaining theory ;...

Within this paper we conclude the treatise of vNM-Stable Sets for (cooperative) linear production games with a continuum of players. The paper resumes a series of presentations of this topic, for Part I, II, III, IV, see IMW 483, IMW 498, IMW 500, IMW 534. The framework has been outlined...

This paper continues the treatise of vNM Stable Sets for totally balanced (cooperative) games with a continuum of players. We generalize and extend the results obtained by a series of presentations of this topic (Part I, II, III, IV see [5], [6], [7], [8], [9]). Thus, the coalitional function is...