This study analyzes a real options model of mergers and takeovers between two firms facing different but correlated uncertainty in profits. It is assumed that firms can choose two alternatives; hostile takeover or friendly merger. In a hostile takeover, a bidder firm takes all the extra value...

We investigate the entry timing and location decisions under market-size uncertainty with Brownian motions in a continuous-time spatial competition duopoly model a la d'Aspremont et al. (1979). Under a sequential equilibrium, the threshold of the follower non-monotonically increases in...

We investigate the decision of entry timing and product positions under market size uncertainty with Brownian motion for continuous-time spatial duopoly competition. We show the following results. First, the leader is more likely to increase the degree of product differentiation as volatility...

We construct a Kyle (1985)-type market model in which fast and slow traders are present. After deriving the equilibrium condition described as a simultaneous equation system, we will perform numerical calculations. A major finding is that the fast trader who has an advantage in trade frequency...

We construct a Kyle (1985)-type market model in which fast and slow traders are present. We perform numerical calculations after deriving the equilibrium condition, described as a simultaneous equation system. A major finding is that the fast trader, who has an advantage in trade frequency, acts...

We investigate the entry timing and location decisions under market-size uncertainty with Brownian motions in a continuous-time spatial competition duopoly model a la d'Aspremont et al. (1979). Under a sequential equilibrium, the threshold of the follower non-monotonically increases in...

We investigate the product positioning decisions of two firms with differential marginal production costs, which enter a market sequentially under a continuous-time duopoly competition. We show that, if the follower firm optimally chooses its entry timing, the leader firm strategically positions...

This paper examines a two-period moral hazard model with an inequality-averse agent. We show how the agent's past performance will help the principal to relax incentive compatibility constraints and how the existence of an inequality aversion of the agent affects a level of wage in each period...

We extend the well-known spatial competition model (d'Aspremont et al., 1979) to a continuous time model in which two firms compete in each instance. Our focus is on the entry timing decisions of firms and their optimal locations. We demonstrate that the leader has an incentive to locate closer...