We study a model of network formation and start-up financing with endogenous entrepreneurial type distribution. A hub firm admits members to its network based on signals about entrepreneurs' types. Network membership is observable, which allows lenders to offer different interest rates to...

We study a model of network formation and start-up financing with endogenous entrepreneurial type distribution. A hub firm admits members to its network based on signals about entrepreneurs’ types. Network membership is observable, which allows lenders to offer different interest rates to...

This article investigates signaling and screening roles of wage offers in a single-play matching model with two-sided unobservable characteristics. It generates the following predictions as matching equilibrium outcomes: (i) 'good' jobs offer premia if 'high-quality' worker population is large;...

This paper studies screening and signaling roles of the offer wage and investigates its impact on matching efficiency. It develops a matching model of a large job market populated by observationally indistinguishable, heterogeneous firms and workers. Heterogeneity is introduced in the simplest...

We study a model of network formation and start-up financing with endogenous entrepreneurial type distribution. A hub firm admits members to its network based on signals about entrepreneurs' types. Network membership is observable, which allows lenders to offer different interest rates to...

We consider a multi-stage game of fund-raising to study the announcement strategy of a fund-raiser, who is privately informed about the number of potential contributors, with the objective of collecting maximal contributions for a public project. We show that whether the public project is convex...

We study and compare law enforcement costs under two alternative burden of proof rules with the objective of reducing crime to a target level. We show that presuming innocence rather than guilt has a cost advantage, mainly due to lower costs of preventing collusion between law enforcers and...

We study a model of network formation and start-up financing with endogenous entrepreneurial type distribution. A hub firm admits members to its network based on signals about entrepreneurs’ types. Network membership is observable, which allows lenders to offer different interest rates to...

We study the problem of controlling bribery at minimum incentives cost in a four-layer, principal-supervisor-agent-client, model of public office. The model includes a second check of corruption by an incorruptible detector such as an outside inspector, the media or any whistle-blower. We...