The problem of information exchange arises in many contexts, ranging from computer science to linguistics to financial accounting. One aspect of this problem is the choice of whether to use a single standard for all users of information or whether to use different languages for different...

The problem of information exchange arises in many contexts, ranging from computer science to linguistics to financial accounting. One aspect of this problem is the choice of whether to use a single standard for all users of information or whether to use different languages for different...

This article develops a method for drawing samples from which it is impossible to infer any quantile or moment of the underlying distribution. The method provides researchers with a way to give subjects the experience of ambiguity. In any experiment, learning the distribution from experience is...

This paper studies an economy where agents trade using a shared language, so that they do not need to meet in person with goods physically present. Agents provide vague descriptions of proposed net trades, which we interpret as arising either from inherent limitations in what the agents can...

'Prominence' plays an important role in financial reporting – an entity might assign an item to the footnotes, report it below the line, or comment on it in a press release versus the MD&A. We propose a model where quantitative disclosures are classified as more or less prominent, based on...

In this paper, we describe a bankruptcy game played in a pure-exchange, perfectly competitive economy, and establish the existence of competitive equilibria. The game admits of lying by borrowers and costly auditing by lenders. The equilibria are characterized by (endogenously determined)...

We provide a theory of decision under ambiguity in which the worst-case and best-case expected utility representations are sufficient statistics for a decision maker's preferences; we refer to the new utility functions as meta-utilities. Our approach, which generalizes many of the commonly used...

We study the design of public information structures that maximize the probability of selecting a Pareto dominant equilibrium in symmetric (2 x 2) coordination games. Because the need to coordinate exposes players to strategic risk, we treat the designer as able to implement an equilibrium only...

This article develops a method for drawing samples from a distribution with no finite quantiles or moments. The method provides researchers with a way to give subjects the experience of ambiguity. In any experiment, learning the distribution from experience is impossible for the subjects,...