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We show that too much meritocracy, modeled as accuracy of performance ranking incontests, can be a bad thing: in contests with homogeneous agents, it reduces output and isPareto inefficient. In contests with sufficiently heterogeneous agents, discouragement andcomplacency effects further reduce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012906885
We study career choice when competition for promotion is a contest. A more meritocratic profession always succeeds in attracting the highest ability types, whereas a profession with superior promotion benefits attracts high types only if the hazard rate of the noise in performance evaluation is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013107356
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We show that too much meritocracy, modeled as accuracy of performance ranking in contests, can be a bad thing: in contests with homogeneous agents, it reduces output and is Pareto inefficient. In contests with sufficiently heterogeneous agents, discouragement and complacency effects further...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932489
Is it better to be a big fish in a small pond or a small fish in a big pond? To find out, we study self-selection into contests among a large population of heterogeneous agents. Our simple and highly tractable model generates many testable and sometimes surprising predictions. For example: 1)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011344712
Is it better to be a big fish in a small pond or a small fish in a big pond? To find out, we study self-selection into contests among a large population of heterogeneous agents. Our simple and highly tractable model generates many testable and sometimes surprising predictions. For example: 1)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013013077
We show that the value of commitment in many standard games is fragile. Specifically, when the second mover faces a small cost to observe the first mover's action, equilibrium payoffs are identical to the case where observation is in finitely costly or the first mover's actions are completely...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013129952
We show that too much meritocracy, modeled as accuracy of performance ranking in contests, can be a bad thing: in contests with homogeneous agents, it reduces output and is Pareto inefficient. In contests with sufficiently heterogeneous agents, discouragement and complacency effects further...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012851832