We give rigorous game-theoretic meaning to the Stackelberg notions of time inconsistency and to the idea of commitment being of value (or sequential irrationality). Time inconsistency treats desirable deviations only along the path, whereas sequential irrationality treats deviations everywhere...

The paper offers a game-theoretic framework for discussing commitment and time consistency. We show when a commitment (or just the appearance of one) is valuable, how valiable it is, and whether the commitment is time consistent. We formulate restrictions on the set of eligible commitments....

The paper formalizes several of the ideas about commitment set out by Thomas Schelling in 'The Strategy of Conflict'. Using a game-theoretic framework we formalize and interpret 'promise' and 'threat' as different species of commitment. We also distinguish the 'pure promise', the 'pure threat',...

This paper was presented at the conference "Policies to Promote Affordable Housing," cosponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and New York University's Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy, February 7, 2002. It was part of Session 2: Affordable Housing and the Housing...

How many adults should live in a house? How do people actually divide themselves up among households? Average household sizes vary substantially, both over time and in the cross-section. In New York City, we find that housing and income maintenance policies exert powerful influences on household...

Studies of homelessness that use city-level observations get systematically different results from studies that use individual-level data. I explain why. The findings are consistent with a model of homelessness as a condition requiring a conjunction of unfortunate circumstances.