Information products provide agents with additional information that is used to update their actions. In many situations, access to such products can be quite limited. For instance, in epidemics, there tends to be a limited supply of medical testing kits or tests. These tests are information...

This paper studies information design in social networks. We consider a setting, where agents' actions exhibit positive local network externalities. There is uncertainty about the underlying state of the world, which impacts agents' payoffs. The platform can choose a signaling mechanism that...

In this paper, we study the problem of identifying network effects in contagion processes and present an application to the propagation of influenza in the United States. In particular, using data on the evolution of infections over time, the travel intensity between states as well as...

In this paper we study a model of information consumption where consumers sequentially interact with a platform that offers a menu of signals (posts) about an underlying state of the world (fact). At each time, incapable of consuming all posts, consumers screen the posts and only select (and...

We study a pricing and information provisioning game between a better informed seller (such as a retailer) and its customers. The seller is (ex-post) better informed about product availability and can choose how to communicate this information to the customers. Using a Bayesian persuasion...

An ex-post informed Sender wishes to persuade a rational Bayesian Receiver to take a desired action, as in the classic Bayesian Persuasion model studied by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). However, we consider settings in which Sender cannot reliably commit to a signal mechanism. An alternative...

We consider the problem of selling a single item to $n$ unit-demand buyers to maximize revenue, where the buyers' values are independently distributed (not necessarily identical) according to publicly known distributions but unknown to the buyers themselves, with the option of allowing buyers to...

We study the optimal pricing strategy of a monopolist selling homogeneous goods to multiple buyers over multiple periods. The customers choose their time of purchase to maximize their payoff that depends on their valuation of the product, the purchase price, and the utility they derive from past...

We study the effects of testing policy on voluntary social distancing and the spread of an infection. Agents decide their social activity level, which determines a social network over which the virus spreads. Testing enables the isolation of infected individuals, slowing down the infection. But...